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On 16 September 1975, after almost a century of colonial rule, the Pacific
Island state of Papua New Guinea became an independent nation. During
the colonial period, customary law and traditional dispute settlement pro-
cesses continued unofficially to guide the everyday lives of the people. But
custom was recognized in the official courts only in limited circumstances.
At independence, Papua New Guinea, like other newly emergent states,
sought to turn away from its colonial past and to weld a unified nation
partly through a reaffirmation of precontact customs and traditions. An
attempt to integrate customary law into the formal legal system was a
major aspect of this program, and among the measures enacted to carry it
out was the creation of village courts, which were intended to be forums
for the application of customary law and the use of customary dispute set-
tlement methods such as negotiation and mediation.
In the first years of their operation the village courts were severely criti-
cized for tending toward excessive legalism, copying the laws and proce-
dures of the imported legal system, and neglecting the informal and com-
promise-oriented processes of traditional dispute settlement (Gawi, Ghai,
and Paliwala 1976; Paliwala 1978; 1982; Fitzpatrick 1980; Snyder 1980;
lamo 1987). Even those observers who disagreed with the severity of these
critiques confirmed that adjudication in the village courts was tending
toward formalism, although they found elements of customary law and
process in the courts' activities outside official hearings (Scaglion 1979;
1983; Scaglion and Whittingham 1985; Westermark 1978; 1985; 1986;
A. Strathern 1984; Gordon and Meggitt 1985).
Most of the studies of village courts occurred in the first years of their
operation, between 1976 and 1979, and were as much predictive as experi-
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entia!. In 1988, we began a new study of village courts,l partly to deter-
mine whether they had forsaken custom, as their early critics warned. If,
in their formative years, the village courts adopted a Westernized model
for adjudicating disputes, then one might expect in 1988, approximately
ten years after most of the studies were done, to find this legalism deeply
entrenched. Instead, the village courts that we observed in 1988 continue
to exhibit a mixture of customary and court-like characteristics, and the
courts' application of customary law and traditional methods of dispute
management occurs not only in their extrajudicial activities but also in the
context of official court hearings. If the village courts had become entirely,
or even primarily, mimics of the imported courts, then it would be appro-
priate to ask whether any institution can successfully apply customary law
in a society radically changed from the collection of homogeneous and
essentially independent villages in which customary norms and methods
of conflict resolution were fashioned. However, because the village courts
have effected a blending of custom and the imported legal system, it seems
more apt to consider their process as an example of the kinds of change
that customary law undergoes as it operates in a transformed environ-
ment.
THE RECEPTION OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE MODERN STATE
Many former colonies have at independence expressed an intent to revital-
ize precolonial legal processes, but by and large they have not succeeded in
freeing themselves from the dominance of legal systems imposed during
the colonial period. In Papua New Guinea, for example, the higher trial
and appellate courts virtually ignored custom in the years immediately
after independence (Law Reform Commission 1977; Lynch 1976; O'Neill
1976; Ottley and Zorn 1983; Weisbrot 1987). A variety of theories have
been advanced attempting to account for this. Legal historians point to
the denigration of customary law in some colonies, when colonial admin-
istrators refused to consider it law at all and announced that the law of the
colonizer was being imported into an otherwise lawless situation (Bayne
1975). Modernization theorists, arguing from the assumption that Western
legal processes lay the groundwork for economic and political develop-
ment to occur, posit that a return to non-Western law would inhibit devel-
opment (Trubek and Galanter 1974; Merryman 1977). Dependency theo-
rists counter that former colonies, though politically independent, are still
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economically dependent on the West and therefore inclined to shape their
laws in ways approved by Western powers (Snyder 1980). Neo-Marxists
point out that the imported law, which protects the interests of individual
entrepreneurs and the propertied classes, is more suited to the class system
of capitalism than is customary law, which supports equality and reci-
procity (Fitzpatrick 1980). Others have noted that the creation of the
nation-state requires the concomitant development of a legal system of
codes, courts, and cases, in order to support the authority of and give
legitimacy to the new nation-state apparatus (Diamond 1973).
What most of these explanations have in common is the unexamined
assumption that Western law and legal procedures are better suited to
large, heterogeneous societies (in which the distribution of economic
resources and social rewards is determined by the market or by the state)
than is custom, which operates in small, undiversified societies (in which
the major allocative modes are reciprocity and redistribution). Early
studies of village courts, which found them to be adopting the formalism
of the imported courts, supported the view that custom is inapplicable to
the complex socioeconomic system that Papua New Guinea had become.
But, if village courts are successfully applying customary norms and using
customary procedures, one can argue that customary law does have a
place in a diversified state system. The question then becomes not whether
customary law can succeed in a changed environment, but what the form,
content, and role of customary law will be. A thesis of this article is that
custom will have an impact on its environment and, conversely, that cus-
tom itself will undergo changes caused by its interaction with the trans-
formed environment in which it now operates.
The role of custom as part of a state structure will be very different
from its role as the sole normative system of clans and village. The village
courts are the lowest rung of the national court hierarchy. They were
created to serve rural villagers and the urban working class. They do not
hear cases involving major corporate or governmental interests. They
can be seen either as methods of containment, in that they placate the
common people with customary law, while important business, gov-
erned by other laws, goes on elsewhere (Fitzpatrick 1980); or, if one puts
one's faith in the common people, the village courts can be seen as agents
for social change, in that their reinforcement and restatement of custom-
ary norms will have an impact in shaping the nation's economic and politi-
cal future.
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THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE VILLAGE COURTS
Although state recognition of customary tribunals at the village level was
periodically debated from the late I940S through the I96os, a village court
system was not adopted until the Village Courts Act was passed in I973
(Chalmers I978). The first village courts were officially established in I975
(Village Courts Secretariat I976). The Papua New Guinea Village Courts
Secretariat, a division of the Ministry of Justice, reports that by July I988
more than nine hundred village courts were in operation, serving approxi-
mately eighty percent of the population of the country. While most village
courts are in rural areas, a few were established in I988 in urban neighbor-
hoods. Some of these urban courts handle disputes among people from
different areas of the country, who may have different customs; others
have been established in settlements composed of people from one area of
the country with a single customary legal system.
The officers of the village courts include magistrates, clerks, and village
court peace officers. The magistrates are supposed to be representative of
the traditional population groupings of the area, and no formal qualifica-
tions for the position are required. They are nominated by the village
courts secretariat after consultation with local persons and groups includ-
ing the local government council, and are appointed by the minister for
justice. Some of the magistrates hold traditional leadership positions in
their villages or clans; other~, representative of the emergent middle class,
own trade stores or coffee acreage or are minor public officials.
According to section 52 of the Village Courts Act, "[t]he primary func-
tion of a Village Court is to ensure peace and harmony in the area for
which it is established by mediating in, and endeavouring to obtain just
and amicable settlements of disputes." The act's vision of the courts was
modeled on reports of unofficial moots conducted by villagers during the
colonial period (M. Strathern I972; Epstein I974; Reay I974). To this end,
sections 57 and 58 of the act direct magistrates to decide matters before
them "in accordance with substantial justice" and to apply "any relevant
custom" even though it is inconsistent with statutory law. In addition,
local government councils may make rules declaring custom, which are
then binding on the village courts.
Village courts have jurisdiction over both criminal offenses and civil
disputes. The act restricts the courts' criminal jurisdiction to minor
offenses and to breaches of local government council rules. The courts
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may impose a fine of up to 1<2.00 (Kl is the equivalent of approximately
US $1.20) or up to six months of community work. A K200 fine is a very
large amount for a subsistence farmer in a country where the per capita
share of gross national product was only K695 in 1986 (World Bank 1988,
3). An imprisonment order may be issued only if an order of the court has
been ignored or if a person obstructs the work of the court. The act
extends the courts' civil jurisdiction to all disputes that arise within their
territory, except disputes over ownership of land and those involving the
driving of a motor vehicle. In resolving a dispute, the court is limited to an
award of up to KI000 compensation or twelve weeks' work for most mat-
ters, but there is no limit on the amount of compensation that may be
awarded for cases involving child custody, bride-price, and death.
In civil matters, the act requires that magistrates first attempt to medi-
ate the dispute. Only if mediation is not successful may the court exercise
its compulsory jurisdiction to hold a hearing and adjudicate the issues. An
appeal may be made from the decision of a village court to a local court or
district court magistrate, who sits with two village court magistrates to
hear the appeal. In addition, local or district court magistrates may choose
to review village court cases, even if the parties have not appealed.
THE "WESTERNIZATION" OF THE VILLAGE COURTS
A village court hearing is in many ways unlike a traditional village moot.
Many village court magistrates do not attempt informal mediation before
holding a formal hearing and adjudication. Hearings are held in nontradi-
tional venues and buildings, with Western trappings such as flags and ben-
ches. Village court peace officers, sporting natty blue uniforms and bright
red badges, officiously maintain order and decorum in the court. The
magistrates limit participation in hearings to the parties directly involved
in the dispute, instead of seeking contributions from all the villagers. The
rules of procedure and evidence are strictly construed so that debate is lim-
ited to the immediate issue. The village courts have been subjected to con-
siderable criticism for adopting these indicia of the imported legal system.
The Goroka Conference on Village Courts, sponsored by the Papua New
Guinea Law Reform Commission in 1976, for example, concluded that
the village courts were already behaving too much like the imposed West-
ern-style courts (Gawi, Ghai, and Paliwala 1976, 264).
This criticism of the village courts is based on the notion that there are
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two models of dispute settlement-a "court model" and a "compromise
model"-and that village courts, which were intended to observe the com-
promise model, have strayed into the court model. Drawing on the work
of Nader (1969), Abel (1973), and Gulliver (1973), Westermark has sum-
marized the major features of the two models:
[F]irst, court proceedings are triadic, or involve a third party to the discussion
of the dispute, whereas compromise proceedings are dyadic; second, in court
proceedings, the third party holds coercive power that can be applied to the lit-
igants, a power that does not exist in the compromise proceedings; third,
norms are applied within the court, in contrast to the pursuit of interest by the
compromising parties; fourth, the court is interested in establishing the past
facts of the case, whereas facts are less relevant in the compromise situation;
this is because, fifth, the court is interested in resolving a particular trouble
case that occurred in the past, while compromising parties are attempting to
establish their own most positive position as they see it for the future; sixth,
the conclusion of the court proceeding is a verdict, whereas compromising
results in an agreement; seventh, outcomes are typically winner-take-all in the
court proceedings and, as its name would indicate, compromises in the com-
promise proceedings. (Westermark 1978, 82)
Models are idealized abstractions from reality, and as such their nature is
to be oversimplified and incomplete. Reliance on them to describe actual
social conditions can be misleading. The idealization of customary law as
compromise-oriented and common law as rule-oriented is enlightening to
the extent that it alerts us to differences in emphasis between the two legal
regimes, but it can be dangerous if we then expect reality always to con-
form to it. Customary law is not always compromise-oriented. It may not
even be usually compromise-oriented. Papua New Guinea village disputes
might go on for years; compromise settlements might be reopened again
and again; and for a winner-take-all solution, nothing beats tribal war.
Nor do common law judges always avoid compromise and apply the rules
with rigid certainty. Most common law rules are phrased at a level of gen-
erality that makes it possible to change them to meet changing social con-
ditions and to adapt them to effect what may actually be a compromise
decision.
In their rigidity, models fail to take account of people's ability to con-
struct a unique reality out of the common means available to them. Living
institutions, such as the village courts, exhibit characteristics of both mod-
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els, blended in ways suited to the needs of the participants in the institu-
tion. "By limiting the observer's interpretive framework, the application of
the models may deny the cultural creativity of the people whose dispute
processing is being observed" (Westermark 1978,83). The models do have
some utility, however, in emphasizing that court and compromise pro-
ceedings have very different purposes and are expected to obtain very dif-
ferent results. In general, the court model leads to the reification of rules,
the assertion of rights, and finality of outcome. The compromise model is
flexible and intended to maintain or restore amicable social relations. The
court model is law-centered; the compromise model is centered on the
parties to the dispute.
However, few of the critics of the village courts have based their prefer-
ence for the compromise model on the results it is expected to obtain. Nor
do they discuss whether and how a compromise model can be maintained
when the society in which it was created has been radically transformed.
Papua New Guinea is rapidly moving toward capitalism, so that even in
rural villages, which were once relatively homogeneous and egalitarian,
there is now increasing division of labor, mobility, and the beginnings of
economic and status distinctions. The critics seem to prefer the compro-
mise model merely because they believe that is what the village courts
were supposed to be. Instead, studies of village courts ought to be focus-
ing on the complex interchanges between the customary and the imposed
systems-on ways in which customary law and the compromise model
can adapt to changing socioeconomic circumstances, and the extent to
which the persistence of traditional dispute settlement practices will alter
or ameliorate the effects of capitalist development.
Some commentators have noted that those who planned the village
courts never intended them to be solely in the compromise model.
Chalmers pointed out that the impetus toward the establishment of village
courts occurred prior to Papua New Guinea's independence and came not
only from nationalists, who wanted to return law and legal process to the
people, but also from colonial officials, who wished to use village courts
to promote law and order in rural areas (Chalmers 1978, 72). Property
crimes, such as theft and vandalism, were increasing in Papua New
Guinea's rural villages in the late 1960s, as was tribal fighting. One
response of the colonial secretary for law was to advocate the creation of
village courts with criminal jurisdiction (Territory of Papua-New Guinea
1971).
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After the declaration in Papua New Guinea of self-government in 1972,
interest in village courts grew, as did the controversy about whether their
primary purpose was to be a forum for traditional dispute settlement or a
means to promote order and control crime. A countrywide study by two
district court magistrates (one an expatriate and one a Papua New Guin-
ean) recommended that courts on the compromise model be set up in the
villages, with the power to settle disputes, award compensation, and
apply customary law (Desailly and Iramu 1972; Iramu 1975). However, a
study of tribal fighting by another government committee proposed that
the village courts have the power to punish those found guilty of offences
(Committee Investigating Tribal Fighting 1973). This report also proposed
that peace officers be appointed to assist the village courts in enforcing
their criminal jurisdiction. The act consequently passed by the House of
Assembly was a melding of the proposals of both reports, and the combi-
nation in the village courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction and of ele-
ments of both compromise and court models is not a happenstance of
court operations, but is built into the village courts' charter document.
Several studies of village courts in the late 1970S found in their function-
ing aspects of both the court and the compromise models. These studies-
of the Highlands Enga, of the Melpa of the Western Highlands, of villages
near Kainantu in the Eastern Highlands Province, and of Maprik in the
East Sepik-illustrate that, within the confines of the Village Courts Act,
magistrates in different areas solve the unique problems of their areas in
unique ways, so that each court is slightly different from every other. At
the same time, the courts faced common problems, which they solved by
somewhat similar means. The courts were similar in that each adopted the
formalist model in the architecture and furnishing of court buildings, the
uniforms and behavior of court officers, and the restrictive view that mag-
istrates took of the proceedings and evidence relevant to the dispute (Gor-
don and Meggitt 1985, 231; A. Strathern 1984, 130; Westermark 1978, 83-
84; Westermark 1986, 137; Scaglion 1979, 121-126). The courts were also
similar in that each followed the compromise model in settling disputes,
although none did so as part of their official hearing process. In courts
near Kainantu, for example, Westermark found that while the hearings
were conducted in a Westernized way, the magistrates' subsequent disposi-
tions of cases contained many aspects of the compromise model. Magis-
trates often fashioned their disposition of a case to take account of issues
that went beyond the immediate dispute or to give something to both sides
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and aid in restoring peace between the parties (Westermark 1978, 86).
Compensation was the most common remedy, and warnings or no orders
at all were more common than fines or other penalties (Westermark 1986,
143). In addition, although village court magistrates in Kainantu did not
mediate disputes as part of official court proceedings, they recognized and
supported the village's role in informal dispute settlement and referred
some disputes to that forum for mediation. Magistrates made the choice
between informal village mediation and a court hearing on the basis of the
relationship of the parties and the depth of their enmity, sending to media-
tion those most likely to be resolved in that fashion and saving for adjudi-
cation those less likely to respond to mediatory attempts (Westermark
1978,86).
Similarly, in his study of village courts in the East Sepik, Scaglion found
that the relatively formal court hearings were supplemented by informal
mediation held in the village, although the terms of the relationship dif-
fered from that of the courts Westermark observed. In Maprik, the choice
of forum seemed not to be made by the magistrates, as it was in Kainantu,
but by the parties, and not on the basis of their difficulty in reaching
accommodation, but according to the subject matter of the dispute. Non-
traditional matters (such as drunkenness or failure to do work ordered by
the local government council) tended to be brought immediately to the vil-
lage courts for a hearing, while traditional matters (such as land use, sor-
cery, or bride-price) were brought to informal sessions. If mediation did
not settle a dispute, it might go before the village court for a formal hear-
ing (Scaglion 1979, 124-129).
Village court magistrates often acted as mediators in these informal
proceedings, but other important men in the village might also mediate
disputes. Magistrates were more likely to be asked to mediate because
they were village leaders or because they had served in governmental posi-
tions than because they were magistrates. In the Western Highlands, vil-
lagers hear disputes informally right outside the entrance to the village
court building, using local government committee members as mediators
(A. Strathern 1984, 63, 127-128). It is not unusual for Papua New Guin-
eans who have been appointed to minor positions in the government to
serve as mediators in informal village dispute settlement. This was a com-
mon occurrence during the colonial period as well (Epstein 1974,19; Reay
1974,212-213).
Although compromise-oriented dispute-settlement methods are as
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much a part of the total village court process as are formalism and the
court model of dispute resolution, informal proceedings occur outside the
time and place designated for village court hearings, and the results do not
get written up in court order books. In such cases, supervising magistrates
and academic observers alike may fail to recognize that they are part of
the courts' dispute settlement process. While village courts are officially
the lowest level in Papua New Guinea's judicial system, informal media-
tion has functionally, if not officially, become a part of the judicial system
as well (Westermark 1978,87; A. Strathern 1984, 121-128). Paradoxically,
by serving as an alternative to traditional dispute settlement, village courts
enhance the effectiveness of the traditional forum (Gordon and Meggitt
1985, 232). The nexus between informal moots and the village courts is
apparent to the participants, both through the functioning of village court
magistrates as mediators and in the frequent reminders to parties by the
mediators that a village court hearing is the next step for unresolved dis-
putes. A division of disputes into those that will be heard by the village
court and those that will be negotiated informally may not comply with
the letter of the Village Courts Act, which requires that all disputes be
mediated, but this practice fulfills the expectations and purposes of the act
in maintaining traditional dispute settlement and customary law (Scaglion
1979,128).
The creation of village courts has broadened the choice of remedy
agents available to litigants, who can pursue one or more informal ave-
nues before moving to a village court hearing (Scaglion and Whittingham
1985,125-126). But some commentators have argued that, by insinuating a
state institution into an area that had been independent of state control,
village courts do not maintain customary law, but usurp it. Paliwala, for
example, has noted that the Village Courts Act makes customary law sub-
servient to state law in a number of ways (1982, 191). Traditional moots
were the people's law. The villagers themselves called for a dispute settle-
ment proceeding, fashioned its procedure, and decided whether to abide
by its outcome. The creation of village courts constitutes "a radical depar-
ture from pre-existing forms of dispute settlement, and social control gen-
erally, in rural society. The key changes are a greater involvement and
control by the state and a degree of authoritarianism on the part of court
officials. The result is relatively alienated dispute settlement with little
scope for community involvement and party consensus" (Paliwala 1982,
191). First, the introduction of criminal jurisdiction gives magistrates the
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authority to choose the appropriate remedy. The court can decide to issue
fines and work orders, even where the parties might have wished to treat a
matter as one for compensation only, to settle or drop the case. Second, by
giving village courts the power to imprison persons who disobey court
orders, the act has vested the village courts with the state's power to use
force. Third, the operations of the village courts are supposed to be
closely controlled by the state. Magistrates are nominated by the village
court secretariat and their appointments are confirmed by the minister for
justice. The operation of the village courts is overseen by local and district
court magistrates, dissatisfied parties may appeal certain orders of a vil-
lage court to a local or district court, and, in a measure of hierarchical
control unusual within common law jurisdictions, a local or district court
magistrate may review the order of a village court, even when the parties
have not appealed the order (Paliwala 1982,198).
Fitzpatrick has argued that customary law itself is a creation of colonial
authorities and its maintenance among the rural peasantry is merely a con-
tainment mechanism, allowing the common people to have the indicia of
independence and self-rule while denying them the realities of power
(1980, 136). The introduction of village courts, Fitzpatrick has said, was
not chosen by the people, but was "thrust upon them" by a government
concerned to contain illegality and unrest (1980,144). Village court magis-
trates tend to be "middle peasants" or minor government officials,
wealthier than the people they are supposed to serve and more interested
in self-advancement than in trying to preserve the independence and egali-
tarian economy of the village or the integrity of customary legal process
(Fitzpatrick 1980,143).
Some of the findings of these critics have been disputed (in part, per-
haps, because village courts, responding to the social conditions of the
areas they serve, are developing differently in different places). Village
courts in Enga were not thrust on the area, but were established only after
local people, concerned about tribal fighting, requested them (Gordon
and Meggitt 1985, 221-222). The process by which magistrates are
selected differs from one area to another. Fitzpatrick stated that magis-
trates are invariably appointed by local government councils, and Andrew
Strathern found that magistrates in the Western Highlands are appointed,
but magistrates in the Eastern Highlands are popularly elected, and in
Enga they tend to be chosen by clans (Fitzpatrick 1980, 143; A. Strathern
1984,62,126,140; Westermark 1986,136; Gordon and Meggitt 1985, 222-
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225). Magistrates are not always "middle peasants" or government work-
ers. They are as likely to be traditional leaders as they are to represent new
interests, and those magistrates who have had experience as government
officials do not invariably pursue government policies. They are often
chosen because their knowledge of government and access to its institu-
tions makes them more effective representatives of the people (Wester-
mark 1986, 136).
While some of their findings can be disputed, Fitzpatrick, Paliwala, and
other critics of village courts are probably correct in their ultimate intui-
tion that one of the government's purposes in enacting the Village Courts
Act was to replace the "informal machinery which might threaten the sta-
bility of the colonial and post-colonial state with a system which the state
can control" (Paliwala 1982, 197). It may not be true, however, that this
purpose has been realized. A statute's operation does not necessarily carry
out the aims motivating its enactment, and the critics are overstating the
case (and underestimating the power and creativity of village people)
when they presume that the existence of state authority leaves no room at
all for local initiative or autonomy. The imposition of law is not a one-
way street in which people blindly obey each new dictate, but a mediated
process of acceptance, negotiation, and reinterpretation by which people
make the law their own and, in so doing, alter it (Kidder 1979; Moore
1978; 1986; Roberts 1981; Griffiths 1986). Even the most courtlike of the
appurtenances of the village courts-the governmental style of the court
architecture, the decorum expected of litigants, and the evidentiary rules
at hearings-are used by magistrates to obtain the authority (both sym-
bolic and real) that they need for themselves and their courts in order to
pursue the very traditional aim of settling cases in ways that will promote
peace and reconciliation in the village (Westermark 1978, 91-93; Gordon
and Meggitt 1985, 231).
The operation of the village courts is the result of a complex process of
mediation between government law and people's law, a process in which
both undergo alteration. Interpreting the Village Courts Act to suit local
circumstances, magistrates and parties alike alter its procedures in ways
that, given their social conditions, make sense of the act for them and
comport with their notions of customary law and dispute settlement as
well as their notions of the proper functions of the government's courts
and laws. In the process, however, custom changes as well. Informal
moots, once conducted by traditional leaders, are now led by village court
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magistrates and others whose status comes from their positions as govern-
ment officials, and the newly created remedy, should the parties continue
to disagree, is that their cases will be set down for hearing in the village
court.
The creation of the village courts means that Papua New Guinea vil-
lages can now seek state backing to enforce their norms. At the same time,
however, they may not be able to avoid state intervention in norm
enforcement. Underlying the critiques of the village courts is the unstated
assumption that traditional dispute settlement cannot survive in a world
in which Papua New Guinea villages are no longer politically independent
entities, free of any connections to a larger political whole. It is the thesis
of this article, however, based on observations of two village courts in
1988, that traditional dispute settlement procedures and norms are to a
large extent surviving within the village courts, not only in extracourt
informal moots, but within the context of village court formal hearings as
well. Given the socioeconomic changes that have occurred in Papua New
Guinea, customary law cannot survive in any way other than by seeking
the support of the state and by melding with, and adapting itself to, some
aspects of the court model. In this unique melding, customary law is
undergoing change, but so too does it change and redirect the socioeco-
nomic and legal matrices in which it is operating.
CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE VILLAGE COURTS
OF TUBUSEREA AND GEREHU
Our study focused on the village courts of Tubuserea and Gerehu, both of
which are located near Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea. If
village courts were in their early years leaning toward the court model,
one might expect almost ten years later to find the court model deeply
entrenched. And, given the proximity of Tubuserea and Gerehu to the
capital (which is also Papua New Guinea's economic and educational cen-
ter), one might expect these courts (and the population they serve) to be
heavily influenced by the substance and process of the imposed legal sys-
tem and to exhibit even more tendencies toward Westernization than
would village courts in rural areas. Instead, we found the magistrates of
both courts using customary law and traditional dispute settlement meth-
ods even in the conduct of formal hearings.
Tubuserea is a Motu village, of about three thousand people, approxi-
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mately fifteen kilometers from Port Moresby. Although Tubuserea is at
. base a traditional community that existed on its present site for genera-
tions prior to the colonization of Papua New Guinea, many of its Motu
inhabitants are now employed in government or industry and commute
daily to Port Moresby. In many respects Tubuserea still has the aspect of a
traditional fishing village, with stilt houses, under which dogs and pigs are
free to roam and tides ebb and flow, but there are also houses built of
imported materials, electricity, automobiles, and boats with outboard
motors.
While the Tubuserea Village Court was among the earliest established
and has been in operation since 1975, the Gerehu Village Court did not
begin operations until 1988, and was holding only its third fortnightly ses-
sion when this study began. The Gerehu court is part of a program to
extend village courts from their rural beginnings into urban settlements, a
program developed partly as a response to the escalation of crime and the
development of criminal gangs in Papua New Guinea's cities (Keris 1986,
70; Clifford, Morauta, and Stuart 1984). Gerehu, a new and growing
community of about twelve thousand people, is located within five kilo-
meters of the university and the government complex, and was con-
structed (as a neighborhood of single-family houses, many of which are
held on long-term lease from the government) to house people who had
emigrated to the capital from all regions of Papua New Guinea. The resi-
dents of Gerehu represent many of Papua New Guinea's different areas of
language and custom and are widely differentiated in· terms of their work
and income in the urban sector as well.
The Tubuserea and Gerehu village courts are prime testing grounds for
theories about the adaptability of customary law to a new environment.
First, a Westernized economy emphasizes individual property rights and
land as capital and commodity, and exhibits differentiation in work,
income, and status; if customary legal process is not adaptive to that econ-
omy custom will playa lesser role in these village courts than it does in the
courts in rural areas. Second, if local customs are so distinct from one area
to another that it is impossible to formulate a national customary law, the
village court in Gerehu will eschew the application of customary law.
Instead, we discovered in the operation of both the Tubuserea and the
Gerehu village courts the application of substantive customary norms and
the use of customary dispute-settlement processes.
From our observations of hearings in these courts, I have selected a typ-
ical morning in each and will describe all the cases as they came before the
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court on those days. My purpose is twofold: to give the flavor of a day in a
village court, and to provide a sample that illustrates the range of issues,
parties, and responses of magistrates to the cases that generally come
before each of the courts.
Cases in the Tubuserea Village Court
The court session in Tubuserea began on a Wednesday morning at about
10 AM, in a roped-off area in the center of the village, where the three mag-
istrates sat at a table placed under a shade tree. The magistrates were
respected older men, all of whom had devoted their lives to village affairs
and did not work in the urban sector. Court proceedings were conducted
in Motu, the villagers' native language.
The first case was brought by the parents of a young man, about twenty
years old, who had moved into the house of a young woman from the vil-
lage. The parents asked the court to order him to return to their house.
Although it was not at first mentioned, it soon became apparent that the
parents were not prepared to pay bride-price at that time. Bride-price in
Tubuserea has grown in recent years. Two weeks earlier, the bride-price
for one young woman in the village was K14,000 in cash and more than
K2500 in coffee, tea, sugar, and rice. After hearing evidence from the
young man, his parents, his sister, and the young woman, the court
adjourned for a few minutes while the magistrates conferred. They then
told the parties that the court did not have the authority to order the
young man to return to his parents' house. Nor, since the young woman
was not pregnant, did they have the power to order the payment of bride-
price. However, the court advised the young man that he and his parents
should meet with the young woman's parents to see if marriage and bride-
price could be arranged.
In the second case, a younger brother had accused his older brother of
causing the death of their father by sorcery and had threatened to find a
sorcerer to harm the older brother. The case was brought by the older
brother, requesting that the magistrates refer the dispute to mediation.
The court questioned both brothers and again adjourned for a few min-
utes. When they reconvened, the magistrates said that there was no evi-
dence that the older brother was responsible for sorcery. They scolded the
brothers, saying that they had both cried when their father died and that
they should work out their differences between themselves, remembering
that they were brothers.
The third case involved a claim by the uncle of a recently married
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woman that, as immediate younger brother of the bride's mother, he
ought to have had the responsibility for gathering and distributing the
bride-price, a function that had been taken over by two of the mother's
uncles. To establish the customary norm of who is responsible for distrib-
uting the bride-price, the court called a village elder, who stated the cus-
tom (to which the parties agreed) that it was the role of the younger
brother of the bride's mother. However, the mother's uncles argued that
they were justified in taking over the function in this case for three rea-
sons. First, the mother's brother had not contributed to the amount that
would be given to the groom's family in exchange for the bride-price. Sec-
ond, he did not account for some of the money he received. Finally, there
was no unfairness to him in their distribution of the bride-price in that he
was given K30, while they kept less than K30 each. The magistrates agreed
that according to custom bride-price ought to be distributed by a mother's
brother but held that the mother's uncles were justified in this case in tak-
ing over the distribution because of the conduct of the mother's brother.
Cases in the Gerehu Village Court
The fortnightly Wednesday session of the Gerehu Village Court began
with the peace officers and magistrates lining up on opposite sides of the
court table to be led in prayer by the senior magistrate. The prayer, like
most of the business of this court, which serves a settlement of people who
speak many of Papua New Guinea's seven hundred different languages,
was spoken in Tok Pisin, one of the lingua francas of the country. Court
was held on the veranda of the Gerehu local council office, next door to
the outdoor stalls and lively bargaining of the public market. The three
magistrates, the senior magistrate (who was not officially hearing cases
that day, but who frequently gave his colleagues advice), and the clerk all
hold minor public-service positions. In three of the four cases heard that
morning, plaintiff and defendant were originally from different parts of
Papua New Guinea.
The plaintiff in the first case, a man from Goilala, had paid Kso to the
defendant, a police officer originally from Morobe, who had promised to
give the plaintiff a driver's license. The defendant had neither supplied the
promised license nor returned the money. He argued that he was merely a
conduit for payments to another police officer who regularly sold driver's
licenses. There was no discussion, during the presentation of evidence, of
the distinctions between lawful and unlawful means of giving and obtain-
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ing driving licenses. At the conclusion of the evidence, however, the mag-
istrates held a short conference among themselves and returned to lecture
both parties on the evils of bribery, to order the defendant not only to
repay K50 to the plaintiff but also to pay a fine for bribery of another K50
to the court, and to order the plaintiff to pay to the court a fine of K20 for
his part in attempting to obtain a license improperly. When the defendant
debated the verdict, arguing again that he was merely a conduit for
another officer, the magistrates agreed to postpone their order for two
weeks, when a hearing could be held with additional witnesses present.
The second case also involved an unlawful activity and the nonpayment
of money. The plaintiff had given K25 to the defendant, who had prom-
ised to buy him beer at an unlicensed shop. The defendant had not bought
the beer and had returned only K5 to the plaintiff, who asked for the
return of the K20 and KIO in interest. The magistrates responded with a
stern lecture to the parties against drinking in general and attempting to
buy beer from black-market dealers in particular, but ordered the defen-
dant to repay to the plaintiff the K20 outstanding, plus K5 in interest.
In the third case, a woman originally from Popondetta, a coastal com-
munity, asked the court to order her husband, who had been several
months in his home village in the Highlands, to return to her and their
children in Gerehu. The man was represented at the hearing by a wantok
(a man from his Highlands clan). The magistrates declined to order him to
return, explaining that he had broken no law. They suggested to his wan-
tok, however, that it would be a good idea for the errant husband to
return to his spouse and that his wantoks should persuade him to do so.
They also informed his wife that she could ask the welfare office to order
him to pay maintenance for her and the children.
The fourth case of the morning had arisen at a prior hearing, when the
plaintiff, a woman originally from the Simbu area of the Highlands,
accused the defendant, a woman from the Sepik, of making insulting
statements. At the earlier hearing, the magistrates had learned that the
statements were made in the course of an argument between the women
over a garden plot, and the hearing had been adjourned so that witnesses
to the women's use of the garden could be called. The garden is located on
a hill above the settlement, where many Gerehu residents have made small
gardens. At this morning's hearing, a village court peace officer testified
that, from his garden higher up the hill, he had often observed the defen-
dant working in the garden, but had never seen the plaintiff, except when
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she came to gather produce. On the basis of this testimony, the magis-
trates ordered the plaintiff to give K2 to the defendant in payment for
pumpkins that the plaintiff had taken from the garden and to give KS to
the court as a fine for taking produce from another woman's garden. The
court did not order the defendant to pay anything in compensation or as a
fine for the insults that had prompted the case, although they did counsel
her against the use of intemperate language. At first, the plaintiff reacted
angrily to the verdict, shouting that she would clear all the pumpkins from
the garden and stalking off to confer with a small group of wantoks who
had gathered under a tree a few yards from the court. However, she
returned in a few minutes to tell the court that she would accept its deci-
sion, because in criticizing the defendant's language the court had upheld
the plaintiff's dignity.
Formalism in the Tubuserea and Gerehu Village Courts
The hearings of these cases in the Tubuserea and Gerehu village courts
differed from traditional village dispute settlement in four important
respects. First, the surroundings in which the hearings took place differed
in architecture and furnishing from the open village ground or men's
house where traditional moots occur. Second, the magistrates and peace
officers rigidly maintained decorum among themselves, the parties, and
the onlookers to the hearings. Unlike many informal moots, direct partici-
pation was limited by the magistrates to the parties and a few witnesses;
this was no village-wide give-and-take session. Third, the magistrates con-
trolled the proceedings, taking turns to question the parties, and their
questions tended to keep the issues and evidence narrowly focused on the
immediate dispute. The magistrates did not often stray in their examina-
tion of the parties into a more general discussion of related disputes or
other aspects of the parties' relationship. Fourth, by their maintenance of
a central and authoritative role in the proceedings, the magistrates estab-
lished the appearance that they, rather than the parties, were the focus of
the hearing.
In their architecture and furnishings, the village courts of Tubuserea
and Gerehu attempt, as do village courts elsewhere in Papua New Guinea,
to recreate the atmosphere of formal government offices. Hearings in the
Tubuserea Village Court take place in a roped-off area in the center of the
village, under a large shade tree opposite the church. The three village
court magistrates sit behind a wooden table, attended by seven peace offi-
ZORN. CUSTOMARY LAW IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 297
cers dressed in blue uniforms similar to those worn by the national police
force. Some of the peace officers sport handcuffs, although these did not
appear to be needed at the hearings. A number of villagers sat quietly
through the hearings, in small groups outside the ropes that defined the
boundaries of the court. They listened to the cases, but did not offer
advice or comment or participate in the proceedings, except when a few of
them might be asked by the magistrates to do so.
In Gerehu, the village court convenes on the veranda of the local coun-
cil office, a concrete and fiberboard structure painted a livid yellow. The
magistrates and clerk sit at a large table on the veranda, with the flag of
Papua New Guinea prominently draped behind them. The site is sepa-
rated from the Gerehu open market (where locally grown produce, betel
nut, and string bags are sold) by a wide gravel driveway and a chain link
fence. The people at the bustling market took little interest in the village
court proceedings (they were more intrigued by a television monitor that
had been set up in the market to play videotapes of "Sesame Street" and
"The Flintstones"), although a few wantoks of the parties did gather under
a tree by the chain link fence. The onlookers could see the village court
proceedings from their vantage point under the tree, but could not hear
them.
The behavior of officials, parties, and onlookers at the hearings is
maintained at a level of high decorum. At Gerehu, for example, the more
senior magistrate was the first to question the parties, followed.in turn by
the two magistrates flanking him at the table. The parties, who stood
before the magistrates' table for the duration of the hearing, with peace
officers on either side, were limited to answering questions posed by the
magistrates, and were not permitted to interject or to debate with one
another. The peace officers were assiduous at shushing parties who spoke
out of turn and ordering them to keep their hands out of their pockets. No
one, other than the parties and an occasional witness, was asked (or per-
mitted) to contribute to the proceedings, and onlookers who made the
mistake of wandering onto the veranda were ordered to leave.
Often, the magistrates' questions seemed concerned with eliciting only
such evidence as directly related to the dispute immediately before the
court. For example, in the sorcery case in Tubuserea, the court made no
attempt to discover (and thus to resolve) the manifold and multilayered
conflicts and disagreements between the brothers that, in all probability,
had contributed to their resentment and prompted the sorcery charge. The
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magistrates' questions, and the parties' responses, were limited to a discus-
sion of the means and methods of sorcery that the older brother might
have used and to his denial of the charge. Similarly, in the Gerehu case in
which a wife wanted the court to order her husband's return, the court did
not inquire into the status of their marriage, the quality of their relation-
ship, or any of the reasons why the absent spouse might have chosen to
remain in his home region, all of which might have been questions of great
interest and import to the participants in a traditional dispute-settlement
forum, who would believe that in order to achieve a reconciliation among
the parties it was necessary to ascertain the totality of the dispute.
Finally, the way in which the magistrates shaped the hearings seemed to
make the magistrates the central decision makers, precluding either medi-
ation or an opportunity for the parties themselves (or their fellow villag-
ers) to contribute to the fashioning of a settlement to their dispute. The
centrality of the magistrates was established by their control of the ques-
tioning of the parties, and, at the close of each case, by their retiring for a
few minutes of discussion among themselves and returning to give a lec-
ture and issue a judgment. The solution to the dispute did not arise out of
a process of discussion, compromise, and eventual conciliation by the par-
ties themselves, the ideal of the traditional model. Moreover, the magis-
trates in the Gerehu Village Court used the criminal jurisdiction of the
court to solidify the court's authority. In three cases that ha,d been brought
to the court as civil disputes, the magistrates took it upon themselves to
decide the cases as criminal matters as well. In the driver's license case, the
court fined both the plaintiff and the defendant for taking part in an
unlawful activity; in the beer case, the court lectured the parties about
their improper and unlawful behavior; and in the case concerning unau-
thorized use of produce from a garden, the Gerehu Village Court ordered
both compensation and a fine.
The importance of these formalistic aspects of the village court process
should not be overstated, however. In providing the accoutrements and
decorum of a government hearing, magistrates manipulate formalism to
achieve informal ends. They use the symbolism of their ties to the govern-
ment in order to give them the authority that village elders and big-men
would once have received from traditional symbols and from the cohesion
of the group (Westermark 1978, 91-93; Gordon and Meggitt 1985, 231;
A. Strathern 1984, 60-61). It is also possible that the eyes of Western
observers mistake the content of the symbolism. While it is true that the
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rope-bordered area in Tubuserea and the veranda in Gerehu look a bit like
a local court or a kiap's office, they also look very much like a traditional
ceremonial ground or haus tamburan. The Papua New Guinea flag, with
its bird of paradise, is no less totemic than the giant masks or carvings that
adorn clan houses, where momentous decisions are also made. Finally, the
village courts are not rigidly bound by formalism. While in some cases and
for some purposes, the magistrates limit the discussion to those issues
immediately before the court, in other cases, they will broaden or recast
the issues in ways beyond the powers (and outside the ken) of formal,
Western court proceedings.
Substantive Customary Law in the Tubuserea and Gerehu Village Courts
Substantive customary law and customary legal process were major fea-
tures of Tubuserea and Gerehu village court hearings. Like the Kainantu
and Enga courts, the courts of Tubeserea and Gerehu heard disputes con-
cerning matters common to customary law. All three cases heard by the
Tubuserea Village Court concerned matters-the payment and distribu-
tion of bride-price, the making of a customary marriage, and sorcery-
that would have come before traditional tribunals as well, and all three
were decided with reference to customary norms. Of the four cases heard
in Gerehu, two involved subjects-driver's licenses and illicit beer sales-
that would not have occurred in a precolonial village, but two involved
the customary issues of marriage and the use of garden land; and all four
matters were decided according to the norms of the community, without
reference to the imported law. The two village courts differ in their appli-
cation of substantive customary law. Whereas the Tubuserea court seems
intent on reaffirming tradition, the Gerehu court is, in effect, creating a
new system of customary norms for a new community.
The desire of the Tubuserea Village Court to reaffirm customary law
and process is demonstrated in the two cases it heard that involved mar-
riage and bride-price. In the case in which a young man's parents asked
that he be ordered to return home, the court was in effect being asked to
decide whether customary norms would permit the parents to halt the
couple's relationship and, if not, whether the couple were married and
bride-price therefore due. Motu customary law recognizes several points
at which bride-price will or can be paid (Law Reform Commission 1975;
1986). Payments occur when the couple takes up residency together, at the
birth of a child, and at points in between. The commencement of marriage
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is viewed not as a single event but as a gradually solidifying process. The
court ruled that it had the power neither to order the young man's return
nor to require the payment of bride-price. By seemingly declining to make
an order, the court effectively levered the two families into negotiating the
terms of the marriage. This outcome supports the primacy both of sub-
stantive customary law and of the principle that customary law is not a set
of rigid rules but a flexible framework in which negotiation can occur.
The outcome itself mirrored the customary process and could not have
occurred were it not that Motu customary law is sufficiently flexible to
permit the court to devise such an outcome.
The Tubuserea court's other bride-price case also demonstrates the
court's concern that customary law be found and applied in traditional
ways. To assist it in resolving the conflict about which uncle ought to have
distributed the bride-price, the court called on village elders to elucidate
the applicable customary norm. The court may have called for assistance
from the elders because the norm was obscure, or in resolving a conten-
tious dispute it might have felt a need for the authority that a pronounce-
ment by elders confers. As well, by deferring to the elders, the court was
modeling for villagers a traditional method for finding the law, and
thereby reinforcing continued reliance on this traditional procedure.
Gerehu is too new to have traditions, and one task of the Gerehu Vil-
lage Court is to supply traditions ready-made. In all four cases heard, the
statutes and case law of the imported legal system were potentially impli-
cated, and in all four the village court chose to apply customary law, thus
choosing not to defer to the imported legal system. For example, offering
to sell driver's licenses and purchasing beer from unlicensed premises are
statutory offenses, and could have been referred to a higher court, which
would have handled the case as a criminal matter, meting out criminal
penalties in keeping with the statute, and affording no compensation to
the complaining parties. Instead, the magistrates preferred to retain juris-
diction over both cases and were thus able to treat one with a mixture of
compensation and fines and the other as a matter for compensation alone.
Similarly, a spouse's abandonment and divorce is subject to statute if the
marriage has been contracted under statute, but, in the case involving the
absent husband, the Gerehu Village Court chose not to ask the form of the
marriage, thereby preserving jurisdiction (and flexibility) for itself.
The conflict over use rights to garden land might also have implicated
the laws of the imported legal system, but the court resolved the dispute
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between two women over the use of garden land as if it were solely a cus-
tomary law matter. While this was a dispute that could have arisen in a
precontact village, and would have been decided in that context according
to customary norms about land use, this particular dispute concerned
alienated land that, though freely used for gardens by Gerehu residents, is
owned by someone (probably the government) in fee simple. Under the
norms of the imported legal system, the holder of the fee simple should
decide which parties can use the land. However, the village court did not
refer the issue to the putative owner or to the imported law.
In the manner in which it found and applied customary law to this dis-
pute, the court demonstrated the differences between its circumstances
and those of the courts in more traditional and homogeneous villages such
as Tubuserea. Gerehu is a new and ethnically diverse urban settlement.
The village court must create a new customary law, suited to the needs
and conditions of the community. In doing so, the court cannot rely for
authority on the familiarity of traditional legal concepts, the assent of
elders, or other factors available to the Tubuserea magistrates. However,
to announce that it is creating new law would be to undermine its author-
ity and inhibit its ability to develop a new customary law for Gerehu. This
case arose between parties originally from different areas with different
customs about rights over garden produce, but the court's decision of the
case is phrased as if the case had arisen in a homogeneous precontact vil-
lage. The magistrates did not ask the parties to explain the customary
rules of garden use in their home areas, and did not attempt to resolve the
dispute as if it were a problem in conflicting local laws. Instead, they
assumed the existence of a universal rule, posited upon something very
like natural justice, and declared that the customary law relating to gar-
dens is that the person who plants and cares for a garden has the sole right
to collect produce from the garden. In effect, the court's holding estab-
lished a new norm by which future parties can order their relations and
with reference to which future disputes can be settled, but it cast its hold-
ing as if the norm had always existed.
Customary Legal Process in the Tubuserea and Gerehu Village Courts
Although the formal and legalistic aspects of hearings in the village courts
of Tubuserea and Gerehu are immediately obvious, the magistrates' defer-
ence to customary processes are of equal importance to the outcomes of
the hearings, the relationships of parties to the law, and the development
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of customary law. For example, although magistrates continually insisted
that they would not hear extraneous evidence, they often entirely recast
the issues in order to reach what they believed to be the real dispute. The
Tubuserea Village Court, hearing a case that was framed as a request by
parents that their son return home, recognized that an equally potent issue
in the case was the parents' wish to avoid the heavy burden of bride-price
payments. The magistrates widened the discussion to include the issues of
whether the young couple was married and whether bride-price was due.
Similarly, the Gerehu Village Court, presented with a case framed by the
plaintiff as an action about insulting words, was prompted not only to
recast the case as one involving a dispute over the use of a garden, but to
switch the roles of plaintiff and defendant.
Village court magistrates do not use their authority, as judges in the
court model do, to enforce a judgment on the parties (see also Westermark
1978). Frequently, the magistrates word their decision not as an order, but
as advice. Indeed, in the three cases heard in a typical morning at the
Tubuserea Village Court, the magistrates never made a firm order. In the
case involving the young man who was living with a young woman, the
magistrates refused to order either that he return home or that bride-price
be paid. In the sorcery case, the court refused even to order mediation of
the dispute, instead scolding the brothers for forgetting their filial obliga-
tions and feelings. And, in the case in which uncles and their nephew
feuded over the distribution of bride-price, the court held that the nephew
ought to have distributed the bride-price, but pointed out that its holding
was merely declaratory, as the bride-price had already been distributed. In
each case, the court's refusal to issue a formal order was, in a sense, a cus-
tomary ordering of the dispute, in that it placed the burden of settling the
outstanding issues upon the parties and forced them into traditional and
informal forums for negotiating settlement.
The Gerehu Village Court did issue orders (or attempt to issue orders)
in three of its four cases, although the court's response to the woman who
wanted her husband back was that it could not order him to return. Like
the Tubuserea Village Court, when it did not issue orders, the Gerehu
court issued advice: the magistrates told the absent husband's wantoks
that they should intercede to procure his return. Even when issuing
orders, the Gerehu Village Court did not rely for their enforcement on its
peace officers or other agents of the state, but on the acquiescence and
agreement of the parties. Thus, when the defendant police officer who
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was accused of taking a bribe disagreed with the court's order, the magis-
trates responded by agreeing to rehear the case later. And, when the
woman who had taken pumpkins from the garden responded angrily to
the courts' order, the magistrates signalled that the next case not be called
until she had discussed the case with her wantoks, and was ready to accept
the court's decision. In looking to the acceptance of the parties as the
source of the authority for their orders, rather than to police or other
agencies of the state, the magistrates are honoring the customary model.
They are also ensuring, in a new and heterogeneous village where tradi-
tion gives little support to the court, that the decisions of the court will be
honored.
Both village courts were willing to defer to other agencies, both formal
and informal, rather than to issue an order in every case. Although the
courts differed in their choice of mediating forums, neither ever suggested
that a party resort to a more formal court. The Tubuserea Village Court,
hearing cases within lineages (and between future agnates) in a homogene-
ous village, tended to refer disputes back to the informal dispute settle-
ment of the family and lineage. In the dispute between uncles over distri-
bution of the bride-price, for example, the magistrates interrupted their
own final discussion (which contained repeated statements that this was
not an issue that a court could now decide) to give the bride's mother the
opportunity to state her shame that this family matter was being aired
before the whole village. The Gerehu Village Court, hearing cases of peo-
ple trying to make their way in the urban sector, tended to refer parties to
government agencies that the parties might not have known about, such
as the welfare office, that could offer them assistance in this new world.
Unlike the court model, and like the compromise model, both village
courts saw the reconciliation of the parties as part of their task. Like the
village courts that Westermark observed (I978, 84-85), neither of these
courts acted as if it believed that reconciliation could occur as the result of
a village court proceeding alone. Both attempted, however, to lay the
groundwork for reconciliation, whenever possible, by distributing some
benefit to each party, so that neither would feel that the other had won
everything. In these attempts, the courts manipulated the norms of both
substantive customary law and the imported law. When the Gerehu Vil-
lage Court found that a plaintiff had attempted to bribe a police officer in
order to obtain a driver's license, the court (after a lecture condemning
bribery) ordered that the plaintiff's money be repaid him by the defendant
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and that the plaintiff give some of the repayment as a fine to the court. In
commingling criminal and civil jurisdiction, the Gerehu Village Court is
not simply asserting the primacy of the courts and the state over the par-
ties. Sometimes, it is using its power to invoke criminal penalties as a
means to even the distribution of sanctions and benefits between the par-
ties, and thereby to promote the acquiescence of both parties in its judg-
ment.
CONCLUSIONS AND AFTERTHOUGHTS
Some critics feared, in the first years of operation of the village courts,
that the courts were tending toward excessive formalism, adopting the
procedures of the imported legal system and eschewing the flexible and
compromise-oriented processes of traditional, informal dispute settle-
ment. If the experience of the Tubuserea and Gerehu village courts is any
guide, these fears have not been realized. Although these courts do resem-
ble the court model on the surface (they are courts., after all), these fea-
tures are balanced by the continuing adherence of the magistrates to the
processes and aims of customary dispute resolution. The features of vil-
lage court procedure that replicate a customary or compromise model
occur not only in extrajudicial mediation sessions, but even within the
context and conduct of formal village court hearings.
Much of the formalism of the village courts is inherent in the structure
of the courts, as established by the Village Courts Act. In providing that
village courts would have both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the act laid
the groundwork for a system in which orders would be issued, fines would
be paid to the state, magistrates would have a more authoritative position
than parties in determining outcomes, and the presence of peace officers
would remind parties that the state was actively involved in the process.
The act does not expressly provide for some of the formalistic and court-
like features that village courts have adopted-such as courtrooms that
resemble government offices, the scheduling of civil hearings without
prior attempts at mediation, decisions by magistrates to exercise their
criminal jurisdiction in the course of a civil hearing, and the exclusion
from the hearing of all villagers except the parties and all issues except
those germane to the immediate dispute. However, these are natural out-
growths of a statute that has established, as a village dispute-settlement
mechanism, an agency that looks very like a formal court, in that it has
magistrates and the power to impose sanctions.
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Although the formalistic elements of village court procedure are obvi-
ous, it would be misleading to overstate their importance or to mistake
their aim. The symbolic (and real) authority of the court model is used by
magistrates to achieve ends that are antithetical to the ends that a court
model is commonly expected to achieve, ends that more closely approxi-
mate the results and purposes of the compromise model. In the court
model, impartial adjudicators decide cases on a winner-take-all basis, by
relating the facts of the dispute to known norms. The result is predictabil-
ity, on which actors in an individualistic market system may predicate
their behavior. In the compromise model, the parties reach an agreement
that is, at least for the moment, mutually satisfactory. The result, when
the process works, is the restoration of good relations among the parties.
Village courts contain many elements of the court model, but these are
manipulated by the magistrates and blended with elements of the compro-
mise model in such a way as to permit the village courts to achieve the
/
results of the compromise model. Despite their frequent insistence that
parties confine their evidence and discussion to the dispute immediately
before the court, village court magistrates are willing to recast the terms of
a hearing when it becomes apparent to them that the real dispute to bt set-
tled is not as the parties originally presented it. Similarly, in the pure terms
of the court/compromise dichotomy, the order by a magistrate of a crimi-
nal penalty, such as a fine, is viewed as an indication of the state's superior
control of judicial proceedings, turning the proceedings from dispute set-
tlement between parties into social control by the state. Village court mag-
istrates, however, mix compensation and fines, often as a way of evening
out the benefits and detriments to the parties, so that compromise can be
achieved. Finally, although village court magistrates permit themselves to
appear powerful, they seldom exercise that power. In a typical day of
hearings in Tubuserea, the village court magistrates never issued an order.
In Gerehu, where the magistrates have had less experience, they made
orders, but pulled back on those that did not have the agreement of the
parties. The appearance of magistrate centrality cloaks a reality of party
equality in village court hearings.
Because the study on which this article draws was limited to only two
village courts and to a relatively short time period, its generalizations can
be offered only as hypotheses. Given the creativity with which each court
responds to its particular circumstances and the varieties in customary law
and process around the country, one would expect courts in different
areas to exhibit very different characteristics. For example, in their mixing
RifM!6i1
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of elements of the court and compromise models, the village courts of
Tubuserea and Gerehu differ in ways that reflect the differences between
the two communities in which they function. The Tubuserea Village
Court is located in a community that, though undergoing economic
change, is basically traditional and ethnically homogeneous. In its restate-
ments of substantive customary law and in its deference to community
elders, the village court helps to maintain the traditional norms and social
structure against the incursions of a modernizing economy. The magis-
trates of the Tubuserea Village Court are unwilling to issue binding
orders, both because doing so would undermine the customary dispute-
settlement process, which is party-centered, and because, as members of a
cohesive community, they seldom need to. The Gerehu Village Court is
located in a new and diverse settlement, which must find itself as a com-
munity and help its inhabitants make their way in the modernized sector.
The court furthers these aims in its creation of a customary law (which is
based on common understandings of customary norms rather than on the
imported statutory or case law) for the community and in linking mem-
bers of the community to outside assistance agencies. The magistrates of
the Gerehu Village Court, who do not yet have the support of a commu-
nity that cannot yet be said to exist, use symbols of the court's relationship
to the state, such as the flag or the issuance of fines, to assert an authority
which they then use to empower customary law.
The village courts are attempting to apply customary law and to follow
customary legal process in a society very different from the small, stateless
societies in which customary law was developed. In this endeavor, cus-
tomary law is undergoing changes, but the act of governing a society using
the principles and processes of customary law will also change the course
of that society. A short-term study of two village courts can only begin to
document the various and creative ways in which village courts will blend
the compromise and court models in their pursuit of the aims of custom-
ary law and the consequences of this blending, both to the legal system
and to the societies in which the village courts are operating.
~.
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Note
I The initial phase of this ongoing study, during which the observations pre-
sented here were gathered, was conducted in the summer of 1988. In addition to
myself, Bruce L. Ottley of the DePaul University School of Law and Christine
Stewart of the Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission participated in the
study. We observed the hearings held in two village courts, both in villages
located near Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea's capital. One, Tubuserea, is a
traditional Motu village and the other, Gerehu, is a new urban settlement. At that
time, the courts were holding hearings only once a fortnight (by 1989, the Gerehu
Village Court was holding hearings twice a week), so our opportunity to observe
the courts in action was limited to several sessions of each. The findings presented
in this article can be taken only as preliminary, and our study is continuing. In
addition to observing the courts, we read through court records and discussed our
study with Peni Keris, secretary of the Village Courts Secretariat; Francis Iramu,
senior supervising magistrate for the village courts that we observed and author
of the major governmental study advocating the creation of village courts
(Desailly and Iramu 1972; Iramu 1975), and with magistrates of the village courts,
justices of the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court, lawyers, law lecturers, and
others, all of whom we thank.
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